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"Adam Cohen on 'Conservative
Judicial Activism'
The Volokh Conspiracy
July 9, 2007
Ilya Somin
[Excerpt: Some citations and portions omitted.]
[Adam] Cohen's argument equates
conservative criticism of "judicial activism"
with criticism of striking down laws enacted
by elected officials. That may be Cohen's
view, but it is not shared by the vast
majority of conservative jurists and legal
scholars. For decades, legal conservatives
have criticized the Court for failing to strike
down what they see as unconstitutional
laws, particularly in the areas of federalism,
property rights and (more recently) free
speech. Most conservative (and even more
so libertarian) jurists would agree that
failure to strike down unconstitutional laws
is no less a departure from the proper
judicial role than judicial overruling of laws
that the Constitution perm-its. A few judicial
conservatives (such as Robert Bork and
University of Texas law profiessor] Lino
Graglia) have called for the virtual abolition
of judicial review; so have a few liberals,
such as Harvard professor Mark Tushnet,
and Stanford's Larry Kramer. But such
views are very much in the minority among
conservative jurists and legal scholars-
almost as much so as among liberals.
Cohen also implies that conservatives
contradict themselves by supporting
"overturning" of the Court's precedents and
invalidation of decisions by federal
agencies. Few if any conservative jurists
believe that the Court's precedents are
somehow sacrosanct, especially not if they
conflict with the text and original meaning
of the Constitution. That is particularly true
of the very recent precedents (McConnell v.
FEC, Stenberg v. Carhart, Grutter v.
Bollinger) mentioned in Cohen's post, all of
which were decided within the last few
years by narrow 5-4 majorities. Such
precedents have failed to gain general
acceptance in the legal community (as their
narrow 5-4 margins suggest), and are too
recent to have engendered much in the way
of reliance by the general public. The degree
to which the Court should defer to its own
flawed precedents is controversial among
conservatives (as it also is among liberals
and libertarians). There is no general
conservative consensus in favor of following
wrong precedents, and indeed most right of
center legal scholars tend to the view that
flawed precedents should be overruled, or at
least severely constricted. The same points
apply to flawed decisions by federal
agencies. It is also worth noting that the
Court did not in fact "overturn" the
precedents Cohen discusses, but merely
limited the scope of their application.
Perhaps Cohen means to say that they have
been so severely limited as to virtually
overturn them. If so, he needs to provide an
argument justifying this far from obvious
conclusion instead of a bald and misleading
assertion.
Cohen also contradicts himself on these
issues. If judicial conservatives are supposed
to applaud judicial restraint in overruling
laws enacted by legislatures, why shouldn't
they support the overruling of precedents
that themselves struck down legislative
enactments (as was true of Roe v. Wade and
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Stenberg v. Carhart)? Yet Cohen criticizes
conservatives as inconsistent for supporting
the Court's partial retreat from Stenberg in
Gonzales v. Carhart.
Finally, Cohen commits an egregious factual
error in claiming that the Supreme Court
conservatives ruled in its school affirmative
action decisions that the Constitution
"protects society from integration." As
Cohen surely knows, the Court merely ruled
that the Constitution forbids some types of
racial assignment of students. In no way did
the justices claim that "integration" is itself
unconstitutional-especially if it is achieved
by racially neutral policies.
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"Bowing to Precedent"
The Weekly Standard
April 17, 2006
Robert F. Nagel
[Excerpt: Some citations and portions omitted.]
At the outset of Samuel Alito's confirmation
hearings, Judiciary Committee Chairman
Arlen Specter asked a series of questions
about the rather arcane subject of stare
decisis, which is the judicial practice of
following prior decisions. Eventually the
questions took an odd turn, with Specter
asking Alito whether he agreed that the right
to abortion had special immunity from
reconsideration, that is, whether it is "super-
precedent." Alito parried this by declining to
"get into categorizing precedents as super-
precedents or super-duper precedents." That
sort of terminology, Alito said, reminded
him "of the size of the laundry detergent in
the supermarket." This exchange, which
must have puzzled most Americans, was
highly significant. Indeed, it touches on
ideas that are basic to understanding why the
Court has become such a dangerous
institution and whether the appointments of
Justice Alito and Chief Justice Roberts are
likely to change things.
Although the practice of sticking with
precedent is often associated in popular
understanding with stodgy legalism, it was a
shrewd subject for Specter to choose. Alito,
like any good lawyer, makes his living by
working from the logic of prior cases.
Moreover, a reluctance to disrespect or to
unsettle prior understandings is especially
natural for someone with conservative
instincts. Thus, while it is doubtful that Alito
thinks the Court's famous 1973 abortion
decision, Roe v. Wade, was solidly based in
the Constitution, it is certainly possible that
he might be too devoted to precedent to
overrule it. Other Republican appointees-
including Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and
Souter-refused in Planned Parenthood v.
Casey to overrule Roe largely because they
think it is entitled to a special degree of
respect as precedent. If the original abortion
decision is super-precedent and the Court in
Casey emphatically affirmed that
extraordinary status, then Casey must be
super-duper precedent.
That Alito should have a bit of fun with this
logic is encouraging, but it does not tell us
how willing he would be to reconsider
constitutional precedents. This is crucial,
because 35 years of Republican domination
of the Court has not resulted in the
overruling of a single revolutionary Warren
Court decision-not Miranda v. Arizona,
which imposed a new interrogation
procedure on police departments across the
country, not Griswold v. Connecticut, which
began the constitutionalization of sexual
freedom, not New York Times v. Sullivan,
which turned the regulation of defamatory
speech over to the courts, and not
Brandenburg v. Ohio, which even in this age
of terrorism continues to protect most
advocacy of violence.
The Roberts Court now faces not only
Warren Court precedents but also, even
putting the abortion issue aside, dozens of
far-reaching precedents established during
the Burger and Rehnquist eras. Those
include cases prohibiting virtually all gender
distinctions in the law, protecting
homosexual sodomy, severely limiting
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public religious observances, and preventing
states from regulating profanity.
Respect for precedent means not only that
the justices should follow the specific
outcomes of prior cases but also that they
must follow their logic. The logic of legions
of cases demands that judges second-guess
legislative and executive decisions on the
most sensitive moral and political issues and
that judges decide for themselves on the
appropriate means for achieving preferred
policies. The simple fact is that
constitutional law as set out in the cases now
requires judges to legislate from the bench.
Nominees to the Court can repeat endlessly
that judges should interpret, not make, law.
But unless they are willing. once on the
Court, to rethink the logic of prior cases,
they will have to make law.
This displacement of political decision-
making has had deeply harmful
consequences for our society. It has led
Americans to lose political self-confidence
and to depend pathetically on the judiciary
to resolve the most pressing public issues.
At the same time, since judicial resolutions
tend to be couched in the language of high
principle, the Court's role has reduced the
opportunity for political compromise and
thus has inflamed passions and distrust.
So Specter's questions about stare decisis
were not tangential or technical. They go to
the heart of the question of whether even
sustained, apparently effective efforts to rein
in the Supreme Court through the
appointment process can be more than
marginally effective. It is important,
therefore, to consider carefully the
justifications for the ideas of precedent and
(God help us) super-precedent.
No wonder Specter asked if Roe were not
now super-precedent. When asked about the
weighty considerations discussed in Casey,
nominee Alito replied blandly, "I think that
the Court . . . should be insulated from
public opinion. [Courts] should do what the
law requires in all instances." But that is not
precisely the argument made in Casey. In
fact, Casey comes close to insisting on the
opposite: that the Court should stay with a
decision wrongly interpreting the
Constitution because a reversal of that
wrong decision would meet with public
criticism and disapproval. Insofar as Casey
rests on the relationship between judicial
legitimacy and stare decisis, the Court is
arguing that public opinion-in the form of
attitudes about the Court-should trump
law.
Of course, the Casey Court does not say
outright that Roe was bad law. One would
hardly expect that. But the justices do
acknowledge the possibility that Roe might
have been in error, and they do refer to "the
reservations [some justices] may have in
reaffirming the central holding of Roe." And
they do say that these reservations are
overcome only by a reexamination of the
constitutional questions involved,
"combined with the force of stare decisis"
(emphasis added).
More disturbingly, Casey does not exactly
say that following the precedent set by Roe
is important in order to convince the public
that the Court is in fact abiding by legal
principle. It says, to be precise, that it is
important that the Court appear to be
abiding by legal principle. Indeed, for all its
high-toned references to the rule of law, the
opinion is suffused with cynicism about the
relationship between law and politics. At
one point, for instance, it asserts that,
because the usual reasons for overruling
precedent do not apply to the original
abortion decision, "the Court could not
pretend to be reexamining the prior law with
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any justification beyond present doctrinal
disposition to come out differently from the
Court of 1973." Pretend? And since when is
a considered judgment that a constitutional
ruling was profoundly wrong as a matter of
law referred to as "a present doctrinal
disposition to come out differently"?
More generally, in its discussion of judicial
legitimacy, the Court in Casey refers to the
perception of legality rather than the reality.
For instance, it asserts, "There is a limit to
the amount of error that can plausibly be
imputed to prior Courts." Note: not the
amount of error that might properly (as a
matter of law) be imputed but the amount
that might be made plausible to the public.
Casey is concerned with the perception of
legality more than the substance. Even as it
declares that law must be separate from
public opinion it elevates the public's
opinion of the Court above law.
Casey's rather frantic concern for the
Court's legitimacy is hard to explain. The
justices had no evidence about the public's
knowledge of the doctrine of precedent, no
evidence that people think the Court seldom
overrules prior decisions. and no evidence
that the public loses respect for the Court
when it does reverse a prior ruling.
Moreover, it is not at all self-evident that the
public thinks constitutional decisions are
immune from political considerations or that
this sort of realism would lead people to the
conclusion that the Court is an illegitimate
institution. It is quite possible, in fact, that
among the general public the legitimacy of
the Court is based partly on the belief that
the judiciary does respond to politics and
thus tends to produce results with which
many people agree. It is certain that
multitudes of lawyers, most law professors,
and virtually all political scientists believe
that the Court is influenced by political
considerations. Few of these professionals,
however, would therefore describe the
institution as illegitimate.
That the legalistic fastidiousness of Casey
should be invoked in a confirmation hearing
is downright weird. Even as Specter grilled
Alito about the need to separate law and
politics, the senator was engaged in a very
public process in which politicians try to
affect the direction the Court will take.
Specter was doing so at a time when the line
between political considerations and legal
considerations has largely vanished even in
the way that the justices attempt to justify
their judgments. The doctrine that Roe is a
super-precedent makes completely clear-as
do scores of decisions that rest on precedent
rather than on the Constitution itself-that
the justices (and their apologists) now
believe that the authority of the Court's
decisions is more important than the
authority of our fundamental law.
Whether the Court plays a saner role in our
political system in the years ahead will
depend in large measure on whether the
justices can think realistically and critically
about the practice of adhering to past
decisions. A necessary first step is to drop
the inflated conception of the Court's role
inherent in the word "super-precedent."
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"Roberts, Alito and the Rule of Law"
The Huffington Post
June 28, 2007
Geoffrey R. Stone
For the Supreme Court of the United States,
this will be remembered as the year of
intellectual dishonesty. In their Senate
confirmation hearings, John Roberts and
Samuel Alito cast themselves as first-rate
lawyers, as masters of legal craftsmanship
who are committed to the principle of stare
decisis. John Roberts assured the Senate
Judiciary Committee that judges must "be
bound down by rules and precedents."
Invoking Alexander Hamilton and James
Madison, he affirmed that "the founders
appreciated the role of precedent in
promoting evenhandedness, predictability,
stability," and "integrity in the judicial
process." Although acknowledging that it is
sometimes necessary for judges to
reconsider precedents, he stressed that this
should be reserved for exceptional
circumstances, where a decision has proved
clearly "unworkable" over time. But in
general, "a sound judicial philosophy should
reflect recognition of the fact that the judge
operates within a system of rules developed
over the years by other judges equally
striving to live up to the judicial oath."
Similarly, Samuel Alito testified to the
Senate that the doctrine of stare decisis is "a
fundamental part of our legal system." This
principle, he explained, "limits the power of
the judiciary" and "reflects the view that
courts should respect the judgments and the
wisdom that are embodied in prior judicial
decisions." Stare decisis, he added, it is "not
an inexorable command," but there must be
a strong "presumption that courts are going
to follow prior precedents."
It is hardly surprising that Roberts and Alito
would pay such obeisance to the doctrine of
stare decisis in order to get themselves
confirmed. Stare decisis is, after all, the
bedrock principle of the rule of law. Not
only does it promote stability and encourage
judges to decide cases based on principle
rather than on a preference for one or
another of the parties before them, but it also
serves importantly to reduce the
politicization of the Court. It moderates
ideological swings and preserves both the
appearance and the reality that the Supreme
Court is truly a legal rather than a political
institution.
Disturbingly, John Roberts's and Samuel
Alito's actions on the Court now speak
much louder than their words to Congress.
During the past year, Roberts and Alito have
repeatedly abandoned the principle of stare
decisis, and they have done so in a
particularly insidious manner. In a series of
very important decisions, they have
cynically pretended to honor precedent
while actually jettisoning those precedents
one after another.
The tactic, in short, is to purport to respect a
precedent while in fact interpreting it into
oblivion. Every first-year law student
understands the technique. It works like this:
"Appellant argues that Smith v. Jones
governs the case before us. But Smith v.
Jones arose out of an accident that occurred
on a Tuesday. The accident in this case
occurred on a Thursday. We do not overrule
Smith v. Jones, but we limit it to accidents
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that occurr on Tuesdays." This illustration
is, of course, a parody of the technique. But
it captures the Roberts/Alito style of judicial
craftsmanship.
Let me offer just a few examples. In
Gonzales v. Carhart, the Court, in a five-to-
four decision, upheld the constitutionality of
a federal law prohibiting so-called "partial
birth abortions," even though the Court had
held a virtually identical state law
unconstitutional seven years earlier. As
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg rightly
observed in dissent, the majority, which
included Justices Roberts, Alito, Scalia,
Kennedy, and Thomas), offered no
principled basis for ignoring the earlier
decision. The only relevant change was
Alito for O'Connor.
In Federal Election Commission v.
Wisconsin Right to Life, the same five-
justice majority held unconstitutional a
provision of the Bipartisan Campaign
Reform Act that limited political
expenditures by corporations, even though
the Court had upheld the same provision
only four years earlier. As Justice David
Souter rightly observed in dissent, Chief
Justice Roberts's opinion offered no
principled basis for disregarding the earlier
decision.
In Hein v. Freedom from Religion
Foundation, the same five-justice majority,
in an opinion by Justice Alito, held that
individual taxpayers had no "standing" to
challenge the constitutionality of the Bush
administration's program of faith-based
initiatives as violative of the Establishment
Clause, even though the Court had held
some forty years ago that taxpayers do have
standing to challenge federal expenditures
on these grounds. As Justice Souter rightly
observed in dissent, Alito's argument that
the earlier decision was distinguishable
because it involved a challenge to a
legislative rather than an executive program
has no basis "in either logic or precedent."
In Parents Involved in Community Schools
v. Seattle School District, the same five-
justice majority (with Justice Kennedy filing
a separate concurring opinion), in an opinion
by Chief Justice Roberts, held that the
consideration of race by school districts in
assigning students to public schools in order
to promote racial diversity violates the Equal
Protection Clause, even though the Court
had unanimously declared more than thirty-
five years ago that such a policy "is within
the broad discretionary authority of school
authorities."
As Justice Breyer rightly asked in dissent,
"What has happened to stare decisis?"
Breyer correctly observed that Roberts had
distorted the Court's precedents, "written
out of the law" a host of Supreme Court
decisions, and disingenuously reversed the
course of constitutional law. Whereas Brown
v. Board of Education had held that
government could not constitutionally assign
black and white students to different schools
in order to segregate them, Roberts had the
audacity to cite Brown for the extraordinary
proposition that government cannot
constitutionally assign black and white
students to the same school in order to
integrate them.
John Roberts and Samuel Alito billed
themselves as legal craftsmen who would be
guided not by rank ideology, but by a
respect for the rule of law. They have now
proved otherwise.
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"In Praise of Judicial Modesty"
The National Journal
March 18, 2006
Stuart Taylor, Jr.
During the hiatus between Supreme Court
confirmation battles, we may as well settle the
clash between the conservative and liberal
approaches to constitutional interpretation.
The battle lines are familiar. Conservatives,
led by Justices Antonin Scalia and Clarence
Thomas, say that the sole legitimate approach
is to follow the literal text and original
meaning of constitutional provisions and
amendments. Justices' policy preferences
should play no role, assert conservative
"originalists." But the claim is undercut
somewhat by the consistency with which the
conservatives' votes on abortion, religion,
race, gay rights, and many other big issues
happen to fit their policy preferences.
Liberals and many moderates prefer the
"living- Constitution" approach, which has
been dominant at least since the Warren
Court. It involves using ancient but
conveniently vague constitutional phrases to
enforce "evolving standards of decency," to
promote equality, and to vindicate what
sometimes-liberal Justice Anthony Kennedy
likes to call "the right to define one's own
concept of existence, of meaning, of the
universe, and of the mystery of human life."
Not surprisingly, constitutional evolution in
the hands of liberals supports liberal policies.
Each school of thought is most persuasive in
debunking the other. Justice Stephen Breyer
skewers originalism in his 2005 book, Active
Liberty: "Why would the Framers, who
disagreed even about the necessity of
including a Bill of Rights in the Constitution.
who disagreed about the content of the Bill of
Rights, nonetheless have agreed about what
school of interpretive thought should prove
dominant in interpreting the Bill of Rights in
the centuries to come?"
Even when the original meaning is
undisputed, it is often intolerable to
conservatives as well as liberals. Many
Framers did not see the flogging or even the
execution of a 12-year-old for theft as "cruel
and unusual punishment," for example. And
nothing in the text or original meaning of the
Constitution was designed to bar the federal
government from discriminating based on
race (or sex). This has not stopped Scalia or
Thomas from voting to strike down federal
racial preferences for minorities. Nor have
they hesitated to invoke debatable
interpretations of the Constitution to attack
laws regulating campaign finance and
imposing monetary liability on state
governments.
The living-Constitution approach may be
even more problematic, because it has cut a
wider swath through democratic governance
with even less basis in the written
Constitution.
If the Constitution is an "invitation to apply
current societal values," as Scalia has asked,
"what reason would there be to believe that
the invitation was addressed to the courts
rather than to the legislature? . . . A
democratic society does not, by and large,
need constitutional guarantees to ensure that
its laws will reflect 'current values.' Elections
take care of that."
Consider Roper v. Simmons, last year's
decision barring the death penalty for any
murder committed before the killer's 18t
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birthday. This would have been good
legislation, in my view. But it was bad
constitutional law.
Justice Kennedy's claim for the 5-4 majority
that modem Americans had reached a
"consensus" that no juvenile murderer should
ever get the death penalty was bogus: A
majority (20) of the 38 states with the death
penalty still allowed such executions.
Kennedy's reliance on the laws of almost all
foreign nations against the juvenile death
penalty was a fig leaf for his personal moral
preferences. So was his twisting of the
relevant literature on juvenile psychology to
suggest misleadingly that minors are
incapable of mature moral reflection. And as
Judge Richard Posner of the federal appeals
court in Chicago points out, Kennedy was
tellingly selective in his attention to social-
science literature: He ignored the studies
suggesting that the death penalty may deter
some would-be killers and thus save lives.
In a variation on the living-Constitution
approach, Breyer argues in Active Liberty for
interpretations designed to promote
"participatory self-government" by voters.
But Breyer's support for the 1973 decision
that ended participatory self-government on
abortion-Roe v. Wade-casts doubt on his
seriousness. Especially since his book does
not even mention this, the biggest and most
controversial decision of the past 60 years.
The bottom line is that nonadherents
understandably see originalism and living
constitutionalism alike as smoke screens for
imposing the justices' personal policy
preferences.
This is not healthy. How might we avoid the
worst excesses of each approach?
The best answer is judicial modesty. in the
sense of great hesitation to second-guess
decisions by other branches of government.
Embraced in general terms by then-Judges
John Roberts and Samuel Alito during their
Supreme Court confirmation hearings, the
judicial-modesty approach is expounded more
fully in a November 2005 Harvard Law
Review article by Posner, a prolific and
ideologically eclectic legal scholar.
Posner begins by puncturing the myth that
judging can ever be completely apolitical. In
constitutional cases, he shows, the Court is
unavoidably "a political body . . . exercising
discretion comparable in breadth to that of a
legislature." The most sincere attempt at
"lining up the facts alongside the
constitutional text" usually provides no more
objective a basis for preferring one outcome
to another than for "preferring a margarita to
a cosmopolitan."
Next Posner explains that the justices would
look and act less like political manipulators if
they "acknowledged to themselves the
essentially personal, subjective, and indeed
arbitrary character of most of their
constitutional decisions."
Such self-awareness is rare among justices,
Posner says, because it "would open a
psychologically disturbing gap between their
official and their actual job descriptions."
Instead, "cocooned in their marble palace,
attended by sycophantic staff, and treated
with extreme deference wherever they go,
Supreme Court justices are at risk of
acquiring exaggerated opinions of their ability
and character."
The path of wisdom would be to acknowledge
that "the law made me do it" is usually no
more than a "rationalization for the assertion
of power" of an essentially political nature,
Posner adds. Justices who understood this
would probably be "less aggressive upsetters
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of political and policy applecarts than they
are."
Judicial modesty also converges with a
pragmatic focus on what will be the actual
consequences of a proposed decision. Three
of Posner's examples-cases in which "the
law" did not dictate any particular outcome-
are illustrative.
First, he applauds the 5-4 decision (over a
liberal dissent) in 2002 to allow Cleveland to
finance vouchers enabling low-income
children to leave failed public schools for
mostly Catholic private schools. The major
disputes underlying the case-over whether
the Cleveland experiment would work well
for children and whether it would lead to
sectarian conflict-turned on factual
projections beyond the Court's competence.
"Actual social experiments are necessary to
generate the data needed for intelligent
constitutional rule-making," explains Posner.
"The pragmatist wants to base decisions on
consequences, and it is very difficult to
determine the consequences of a challenged
policy if you squelch it at the outset."
Second, Posner deplores as "injuriously
unpragmatic" the unanimous 1998 ruling
against President Clinton in the Paula Jones
lawsuit: "It should have been obvious to the
justices that forcing the president to submit to
a deposition in a case about his sexual
escapades would be political dynamite that
would explode and interfere with his ability to
perform his duties."
Third, Posner shows sympathy for Justice
Breyer's solo, split-the-difference approach in
two 5-4 decisions last June involving displays
of the Ten Commandments. In one, Breyer
joined liberals in invalidating the recent,
locally controversial installations of
Decalogue plaques in two Kentucky
courthouses. ("I have no settled view" on that
decision, Posner notes.) In the other, Breyer
joined conservatives in upholding a Ten
Commandments monument on the grounds of
the Texas state Capitol, where it had stood for
40 years, amid various secular monuments,
with little ado.
Many critics (including me) have faulted
Breyer's hairsplitting for leaving the law
unclear. Not so Posner: "Compromise is the
essence of democratic politics and hence a
sensible approach to dealing with
indeterminate legal questions charged with
political passion. . . . To give a complete
victory to the secular side of the debate (or for
that matter to the religious side) could be
thought at once arrogant, disrespectful, and
needlessly inflammatory."
Amen. Or, if that offends you, right on.
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"Last Term's Winner at the Supreme
Court: Judicial Activism"
The New York Times
July 9. 2007
Adam Cohen
The Supreme Court told Seattle and
Louisville, and hundreds more cities and
counties, last month that they have to scrap
their integration programs. There is a word
for judges who invoke the Constitution to
tell democratically elected officials how to
do their jobs: activist.
President Bush, who created the court's
conservative majority when he appointed
Chief Justice John Roberts and Justice
Samuel Alito, campaigned against activist
judges, and promised to nominate judges
who would "interpret the law, not try to
make law." Largely because of Chief Justice
Roberts and Justice Alito, the court has just
completed one of its most activist terms in
years.
The individuals and groups that have been
railing against judicial activism should be
outraged. They are not, though, because
their criticism has always been of "liberal
activist judges." Now we have conservative
ones, who use their judicial power on behalf
of employers who mistreat their workers,
tobacco companies, and whites who do not
want to be made to go to school with blacks.
The most basic charge against activist
judges has always been that they substitute
their own views for those of the elected
branches. The court's conservative majority
did just that this term. It blithely overruled
Congress. notably by nullifying a key part of
the McCain-Feingold campaign finance law.
a popular law designed to reduce the role of
special-interest money in politics.
It also overturned the policies of federal
agencies, which are supposed to be given
special deference because of their expertise.
In a pay-discrimination case, the majority
interpreted the Civil Rights Act of 1964 in a
bizarre way that makes it extremely difficult
for many victims of discrimination to
prevail. The majority did not care that the
Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission has long interpreted the law in
just the opposite way.
The court also eagerly overturned its own
precedents. In an antitrust case, it gave
corporations more leeway to collude and
drive up prices by reversing 96-year-old
case law. In its ruling upholding the Partial-
Birth Abortion Ban Act, it almost
completely reversed its decision from 2000
on a nearly identical law. The school
integration ruling was the most activist of
all. The campaign against "activist judges"
dates back to the civil rights era, when
whites argued that federal judges had no
right to order the Jim Crow South to
desegregate. These critics insisted they were
not against integration; they simply opposed
judges' telling elected officials what to do.
This tern, the court did precisely what those
federal judges did: it invoked the 14th
Amendment to tell localities how to assign
students to schools. The Roberts Court's
ruling had an extra fillip of activism. The
civil rights era judges were on solid ground
in saying that the 14th Amendment, which
was adopted after the Civil War to bring
former slaves into society, supported
467
integration. Today's conservative majority
makes the much less obvious argument that
the 14th Amendment protects society from
integration.
With few exceptions, the court's activism
was in service of a conservative ideology.
The justices invoked the due process clause
in a novel way to overturn a jury's award of
$79.5 million in punitive damages against
Philip Morris, which for decades
misrepresented the harm of smoking. It is
hard to imagine that Chief Justice Roberts
and Justice Alito, who were in the majority,
would have supported this sort of "judge-
made law" as readily if the beneficiary were
not a corporation.
The conservative activism that is taking hold
is troubling in two ways. First, it is likely to
make America a much harsher place.
Companies like Philip Monis will be more
likely to injure consumers if they know the
due process clause will save them.
Employees will be freer to mistreat workers
like Lilly Ledbetter, who was for years paid
less than her male colleagues, if they know
that any lawsuit she files is likely to be
thrown out on a technicality.
We have seen this before. In the early 1900s,
the court routinely struck down worker
protections, including minimum wage and
maximum hours laws, and Congressional
laws against child labor. That period, known
as the Lochner era-after a 1905 ruling that
a New York maximum hours law violated
the employer's due process rights-is
considered one of the court's darkest.
We are not in a new Lochner era, but traces
of one are emerging. This court is already
the most pro-business one in years, and one
or two more conservative appointments
could take it to a new level. Janice Rogers
Brown, a federal appeals court judge who is
often mentioned as a future Supreme Court
nominee, has expressly called for a return to
the Lochner era. The other disturbing aspect
of the new conservative judicial activism is
its dishonesty. The conservative justices
claim to support "judicial modesty," but
reviews of the court's rulings over the last
few years show that they have actually voted
more often to overturn laws passed by
Congress-the ultimate act of judicial
activism-than has the liberal bloc.
It is time to admit that all judges are activists
for their vision of the law. Once that is done,
the focus can shift to where it should be: on
whose vision is more faithful to the
Constitution, and better for the nation.
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"Confirmation Report"
Slate
January 12, 2006
Dahlia Lithwick
It must be excruciating. I mean, here is
Judge Sam Alito, slogging through the
single biggest job audition of any lawyer's
life, and all anybody can talk about is John
Roberts. Senate judiciary committee
Chairman Arlen Specter, R-Pa., eight
minutes into the confirmation hearings:
"The preliminary indications from Chief
Justice John Roberts' performance on the
Court and his judiciary committee testimony
on 'modesty,' 'stability' and not 'jolting' the
system suggest that he will not move the
court in a different direction." Then Sen.
Orrin Hatch, R-Utah, reminisces fondly: "As
Chief Justice Roberts described it when he
was before this committee last fall, judges
are not politicians." Then comes Sen. Chuck
Grassley, R-lowa, again borrowing from the
last nominee: "Like Chief Justice Roberts, it
appears that Judge Alito tries to act like an
umpire, calling the balls and strikes, rather
than advocating for a particular outcome in a
case." On and on it goes. All anyone can
talk about is how darn humble John Roberts
is, and poor Alito-who really is humble-
just has to sit there and take it.
Alito can be deft, however. He has a funny
little riff on how the notion of "super-duper
stare decisis" sounds like a laundry soap. He
says, three times, that stare decisis-while
important-is not an "inexorable
command." It's his way of pushing back.
When Arlen Specter, R-Pa., asks this
morning whether the constitution is a "living
thing," his response is wonderful: "I think
the Constitution is a living thing in the sense
that matters, and that is that it is-it sets up
a framework of government and a protection
of fundamental rights that we have lived
under very successfully for 200 years." The
Constitution is living because we live under
it.
When asked what he thinks of precedential
cases this morning, Alito goes with his
standard, "That is an important precedent of
the court." That is a declarative statement,
not a judgment. He frequently adds that
precedent is not an "inexorable command."
And then he tells us that it would be
irresponsible for him to hazard an opinion
about any specific case or legal question
without going through the "whole judicial
process." In other words, precedent should
bind, except when Alito goes through his
painstaking process and finds that it
shouldn't; other branches of government are
due great deference, except when Alito's
meticulous legal analysis finds they are not;
and innocent people have the constitutional
right to be free from execution, unless-
after meticulous consideration-he finds
they do not. Alito is properly renowned for
his adherence to that careful and rigorous
process. But it starts to look as though
absolutely nothing else has any weight with
him at all.
In one of the most poignant exchanges of the
morning, Sen. Herb Kohl, D-Wis., asks the
nominee-almost pleadingly-whether he
thinks he might become a justice who "fills
the same role" as Sandra Day O'Connor; if
"in your opinion, you will turn out in a
general way to be that sort of justice'"
Alito's response speaks volumes. He says
the quality he most admires in O'Connor is
her "meticulous devotion to the facts." the
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appreciation of her "dedication to a case-by-
case approach." That, oddly enough, is
precisely the quality for which O'Connor
has been most roundly criticized. Detractors,
from the right and the left, never tire of
accusing her of approaching every case from
scratch, creating "good-for-one-ride-only"
precedents, and fashioning new rules that
depend entirely on her own subjective
determinations. There is, say her critics, a
terrific grandiosity in a jurisprudential
approach that elevates one justice's views
over those of her colleagues and allows her
own judicial process to trump the wishes of
her colleagues, the states, or the other
branches of government.
Theoretically, there should be comfort in
hearing a judge promise to approach each
new case as an open book; to drill deep into
the relevant statutes and the case law and
emerge with an opinion only after a
meticulous analysis of the matter at hand. It
suggests that past decisions aren't predictive
and that every case brings a fresh start. It
hints at a totally neutral process, untainted
by personal views or preferences. It says
there is no jurisprudential theory at work but
only a mechanical process.
But doesn't Alito's open-mind mantra imply
that with each fresh, new start he will be the
lone, final, unfettered arbiter of every
question? Do we really want every legal
question to be open and every rule to be
mutable? Is there something to be said for a
nominee, like John Roberts, who didn't
insist that the answer to every question
reside exclusively in his own open mind?
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"Originalism, Stare Decisis and the
Promotion of Judicial Restraint"
22 Const. Comment. 271 (2005)
Thomas W. Merrill
[Excerpt: Some citations and portions omitted.]
. . . In this essay, I argue that adopting a
strong theory of precedent in constitutional
law would have at least one consequence
that I regard as desirable: it would promote
judicial restraint. . . . In arguing for a strong
theory of precedent on grounds of judicial
restraint, I recognize that I am staking out an
idiosyncratic position. Judicial restraint is
generally thought to be a conservative value,
yet most conservative constitutional law
scholars today seem to favor a weak theory
of precedent. . . . My claim is that,
abstracting away from these controversies
and contingencies about the political values
of the current Court, someone who believes
in judicial restraint should favor a strong
theory of precedent, at least in constitutional
law.
As I use the term, judicial restraint refers to
a style of judging that produces the fewest
surprises. Restrained judges render decisions
that conform to what an experienced lawyer,
familiar with the facts of the case and the
relevant legal authorities, would counsel a
client would be the most likely outcome....
If judicial restraint means predictability,
then restrained judges are plodders, not
innovators. They are long on diligence, and
short on imagination. They are utterly
conventional and boring. How can
something so dull be a good thing?
One reason should immediately spring to
mind: In a democracy, innovation in law and
policy is supposed to come from officials
elected by the People, not from unelected
judges. The tension between democracy and
judicial activism has been rehearsed so
endlessly in the literature that it is virtually
as boring as judicial restraint itself
A second reason why judicial restraint is a
good thing is that it protects expectations
and reduces retroactivity in legal decision
making. Legal change is not ruled out. The
Constitution can be amended, statutes can be
enacted, new administrative regulations can
be promulgated. But these sorts of changes
occur prospectively, allowing individuals to
adjust their behavior before they take effect.
If legal change is prospective, and courts
foreswear legal change through litigation,
then individuals can be confident the law
applied by courts will be the same as the law
on the books....
A third reason why judicial restraint is a
good thing is that it promotes equal
treatment, in terms of treating similarly
situated litigants similarly. The
jurisprudence of no surprises means that
today's litigant is treated the same way
yesterday's litigant was treated-for good or
ill.
Finally, and related to the last point, judicial
restraint helps judges resist pressure to bend
the rules in ways that operate to the
disadvantage of unpopular claimants or
minorities.
... Let me briefly offer some reasons why,
at least in theory, a strong theory of
precedent-and a correspondingly reduced
role for originalist reasoning-will result in
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more judicial restraint, at least in the context
of modem American constitutional law.
First, precedent provides a thicker body of
norms with which to resolve constitutional
disputes than originalism does. Take
virtually any constitutional dispute you want
on the recent docket of the Supreme Court-
whether the Commerce Clause permits
Congress to regulate the use of home-grown
pot used for medical purposes, whether the
Takings Clause permits property to be
condemned solely to promote economic
development, whether the Cruel and
Unusual Punishment Clause permits the
execution of juveniles. A Court that tried to
resolve these issues solely in accordance
with the text and original understanding
would have much less "stuff' to go on than
a Court that tried to resolve these issues by
examining precedent. The thinness of the set
of relevant norms would make the outcome
less predictable....
Second, precedent is more accessible to
lawyers and judges than evidence of original
understanding. Not only is there more of it,
it is easier to find. Supreme Court
precedents are highly accessible. A full set
of U.S. Reports resides in the chambers of
every federal judge in the country, and is
easily accessed by most state judges and
practicing lawyers. These decisions have
long been headnoted and indexed in various
ways and collected in commentaries. Today
of course they are on line and fully
searchable electronically. The constitutional
text is likewise highly accessible. But other
evidence of original understanding is much
less so....
Third, the interpretation and application of
precedent is more compatible with the skill
set of the typical judge than is the
interpretation and application of evidence of
original understanding. Judges are trained in
law, and law training, at least in this
country, is grounded in the study of common
law and the common law method. To a
significant degree-and I recognize that this
cuts against my thesis-this is training in the
art of manipulation. Students are taught how
to read precedents broadly and narrowly,
how to exact principles not expressly stated,
how to limit precedents to their facts. But
training in the common law method is
also-and this is less recognized-a
socialization process that allows the lawyer
to recognize the difference between
propositions that are settled, and hence are
not eligible for manipulation, and
propositions that remain unsettled, and
hence open to divergent approaches. There
is, lurking in the background, a conservative
bias in favor of preserving what is settled,
and limiting manipulation to the margins. In
this way the common law method, if it does
not generate anything like perfect judicial
restraint, at least produces a style of
decisionmaking that is more restrained than
some imaginable alternatives.
Theory is one thing, proof another. It is
obviously difficult to test a proposition such
as the one I am contending for here: that a
strong theory of precedent is more likely to
produce judicial restraint. But there are
several sources of comparative evidence that
may shed light on the question. I will
provide a suggestive rather than an
exhaustive account of these sources, and
offer my own impressions of what a more
complete investigation would reveal.
First, it would be instructive to compare the
behavior of the U.S. Supreme Court with
courts of last resort in other legal systems.
Comparative law scholars have occasionally
examined the proclivities of different
national courts toward activism. These
efforts invariably rank the U.S. Supreme
Court as world champion of activists. . . . A
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weak adherence to precedent invites parties
seeking social reform to invest in
constitutional litigation. If they succeed
often enough in enlisting courts to adopt
new social policies, the pipeline of litigation
will continually be refurbished with new
legal theories, sponsored by both the left and
the right.
I suspect, but cannot prove, that a more
complete survey of courts of last resort
would show a strong correlation between the
respect for precedent and proclivity toward
activism. Certainly, the contrast between the
U.S. Supreme Court and the appellate courts
of England suggests such a relationship. The
U.S. Supreme Court employs a weak theory
of precedent in constitutional law, and is
notoriously activist. English courts, in
contrast, follow a strong theory of stare
decisis, and are generally regarded as highly
restrained.
[I]t would be revealing to compare the
behavior of the U.S. Supreme Court in
constitutional cases with its behavior in
statutory construction cases. The Court
generally follows a weak theory of
precedent in constitutional cases, but at least
purports to follow a strong theory of
precedent with respect to statutory
decisions. . . . Does the Court's weak theory
of precedent in constitutional cases render it
more activist, in the sense of being less
predictable, in constitutional matters relative
to statutory interpretation? Although it
would be difficult to answer this question
with rigorous proof, there is little doubt in
my mind that the answer is yes. The major
innovations associated with the Supreme
Court-such as outlawing segregation,
mandating one person one vote in legislative
districting, restricting gender discrimination,
limiting the use of the death penalty,
creating rights to abortion and to engage in
homosexual relations, wiping out
governmental efforts to control pornography
on the internet-have come in constitutional
rulings. It is difficult to think of rulings of
equivalent innovation rendered as a matter
of statutory interpretation.
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"Narrow Victories Move Roberts Court to Right:
Decisions Ignore Precedent, Liberals Contend"
The Washington Post
June 29, 2007
Charles Lane
The Supreme Court's decision overturning
school desegregation policies in two U.S.
cities yesterday culminates a fractious term
in which the new Roberts court moved the
law significantly to the right, legal analysts
said.
In a series of 5 to 4 decisions this term, the
court also upheld a federal ban on a late-
term abortion procedure and gutted a key
provision of the McCain-Feingold campaign
finance law. Along with yesterday's schools
case, each of these decisions left open the
possibility of more change in areas of the
law on which the court had seemingly ruled
definitively within the past decade.
"Conservatives got everything they could
reasonably have hoped for out of the term,"
said Thomas C. Goldstein, a Washington
lawyer who specializes in Supreme Court
litigation. "The table is set, particularly if
there are more changes in the court, for
wholesale changes in constitutional law.
There were some incremental steps, but they
were in a distinct direction and a uniform
direction."
The conservatives' advance was limited by
the occasional defection of Justice Anthony
M. Kennedy. Yesterday's case showed
Kennedy's moderating influence, as he
issued a concurring opinion that may have
blunted the practical impact of the court's
ruling.
Because of Kennedy's continued role as a
swing voter, some analysts suggested that
this term's decisions may be the high-water
mark for the right rather than a tidal shift.
"It is a conservative court, but at the same
time, just barely so," said Eugene Volokh, a
professor of constitutional law at the
University of California at Los Angeles.
"The liberals are a forceful bloc and are
willing to fight some old battles and win
some when they swing Justice Kennedy
around."
Still, Kennedy is a different kind of swing
voter from Justice Sandra Day O'Connor,
the centrist whom Samuel A. Alito Jr.
replaced in 2006. He seems more likely than
she was in recent years to side with the right
in close cases. Kennedy wrote the court's
opinion upholding the federal ban on what
opponents call "partial birth" abortion.
This term, the justices split 5 to 4 in 24
cases, a third of the total. Kennedy sided
with the four most conservative justices-
Roberts, Alito. Antonin Scalia and Clarence
Thomas-in 13 of the 5 to 4 cases, while
backing liberals John Paul Stevens, David
H. Souter, Ruth Bader Ginsburg and
Stephen G. Breyer just six times. In five
other 5 to 4 cases, the court did not split
along liberal-conservative lines.
The most significant victory of the term for
liberals came when they secured Kennedy's
vote for a ruling that required the
Environmental Protection Agency to justify
its refusal to regulate greenhouse gases in
vehicle exhaust.
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And whereas Kennedy occasionally applied
the brakes to the court's conservatives,
Scalia and Thomas sometimes demanded
that they move further and faster to the right,
suggesting that Roberts and Alito were
straining to depict their rulings as consistent
with the court's past cases, rather than just
overruling some of them outright, as they
should.
That echoed the accusations fiom the court's
liberals, who have seemed increasingly
united in their view that the Roberts court is
deviating from settled law without openly
saying so.
The liberal justices-Stevens, Souter,
Ginsburg and Breyer-have taken turns
reading their dissenting opinions from the
bench in a show of dismay with the court's
direction.
"Someone like Ginsburg, who used to be a
cautious liberal, is now an angry liberal,"
said Neil S. Siegel, a professor of law at
Duke University and a former law clerk of
Ginsburg's.
And the liberals' dismay has been evident
even in what might otherwise have been
relatively minor, technical cases. On June
14. Thomas announced a 5 to 4 ruling in
which the conservatives said that a
convicted murderer could not pursue an
appeal because he had missed a filing
deadline, even though his attorney had relied
on a judge's erroneous assurance that he had
enough time.
"It is intolerable for the judicial system to
treat people this way," Souter wrote. The
majority could reach its result, he said, only
by overruling two little-known cases from
the 1960s.
As Roberts read his opinion in the schools
cases yesterday, Breyer shifted in his chair,
rubbed his temples and occasionally shook
his head. When his turn came to read his
dissent, Breyer spoke heatedly for almost a
half-hour, much longer than the chief justice
himself had taken to read his opinion.
The 77-page opinion, twice as long as any
other dissent Breyer has written, clearly
occupied much of Breyer's time and energy
during the term.
As his liberal colleagues have done in their
dissents, Breyer accused Roberts and the
conservatives of violating stare decisis, the
legal principle that decisions should
generally be left undisturbed.
"The majority is wrong," Breyer said. "It's
not often in law that so few have changed so
much so quickly."
The charge of ignoring or twisting precedent
stings, because it is essentially an accusation
that the conservatives have abandoned the
judicial restraint that they so often preach, in
pursuit of policy results they favor.
And Roberts, who pledged "judicial
modesty" and respect for precedent in his
2005 confirmation hearings, has responded,
defending his rulings as applications of the
court's existing doctrine.
In the campaign finance case, he argued that
past rulings permitted the court to entertain
challenges to specific applications of
McCain-Feingold and that his decision to
permit a Wisconsin antiabortion group's
television ad was consistent with case law
that barred regulation of all ads except those
that expressly advocate the election or defeat
of a particular candidate.
Yesterday, Roberts peppered his opinion
with phrases such as "under our existing
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precedent" and "the established law." He
also frequently buttressed his arguments
with quotations from the writings of
O'Connor. as if to emphasize that his views
were well within the court's historical
mainstream.
"I thought Roberts was trying to wrap
himself in Sandra Day O'Connor," said
David J. Garrow, a senior fellow at the
University of Cambridge, England.
Roberts also responded in kind to Breyer,
arguing that his dissent "alters or misapplies
our well-established legal framework" and
that his "appeal to stare decisis rings
particularly hollow."
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"The Intrinsically Corrupting
Influence of Precedent"
22 Const. Comment. 289 (2005)
Michael Stokes Paulsen
[Excerpt: Some citations and portions omitted.]
Whatever one's theory of constitutional
interpretation, a theory of stare decisis,
poured on top and mixed in with it, always
corrupts the original theory. If one is an
originalist-that is, if one believes that the
Constitution should be understood and
applied in accordance with the objective
meaning the words and phrases would have
had to an informed general public at the time
of their adoption-then stare decisis,
understood as a theory of adhering to prior
judicial precedents that are contrary to the
original public meaning, is completely
irreconcilable with originalism. Stare decisis
contradicts the premise of originalism-that
it is the original meaning of the words of the
text, and not anything else, that controls
constitutional interpretation. To whatever
extent precedents inconsistent with original
meaning are accepted as controlling
(whether sometimes and to some extent, or
always and absolutely), such acceptance
undermines-even refutes-the premises
that are supposed to justify originalism.
If one is a non-originalist, pragmatist, or
otherwise outcome-driven "interpreter" of
the Constitution-that is, if one believes that
the Constitution should be interpreted in
such a manner as to produce justice, good
outcomes, or workable and fair solutions to
social and political problems, and not be
inhibited by the constraints of constitutional
text, structure, and history-stare decisis
corrupts and undermines such an
interpretive theory, too. After all, why
should an interpreter be bound by precedents
that stand in the way of one's conception of
justice if one is not bound by the language
and original meaning of the Constitution
itself? It would be silly to let errant (on these
criteria), unjust precedents block the way,
especially if the Constitution itself is not
allowed to do so.
Merrill's view is a variation of other policy-
driven approaches to constitutional law. His
favored policies-stability and
predictability-are simply more
"conservative" (in an incrementalist sense)
and nonsubstantive than those animating
other policy-driven approaches. But aside
fiom its merits or demerits as a theory of
constitutional interpretation, Merrill's view
of precedent as a stabilizing force has its
own problems. One problem is the
overconfident assumption that precedents
need less interpreting, or require less legal
competence faithfully to interpret (aren't we
still reading words, just more of them, and
ones that sometimes contradict each other?),
or are less subject to manipulation or
evasion, or provide greater clarity, than
direct interpretation of the Constitution
through some interpretive methodology or
another. A second problem with this view is
that it is usually alloyed with some (or
many) other methodology (or
methodologies) of constitutional
interpretation, combining the problems and
imprecisions of both, with an unclear but
certainly nonabsolute degree of "tilt" in the
direction of precedent and away from the
other interpretive approach(es). That is still
a corruption of the other method(s) of
constitutional interpretation, just corruption
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to some uncertain lesser degree.
A. third problem with this view is that it does
not really provide a justification for stare
decisis, in the definitional sense of adhering
to a precedent decision even where one
would otherwise think it wrong (on other
criteria). It only provides a justification for
reading and considering precedent decisions,
in order to assist the present interpreter in
figuring out the right answer, not for binding
the present interpreter to a result that he or
she otherwise is fully persuaded is incorrect,
on other interpretive grounds. And if
precedent is not binding, we are not really
talking about a doctrine of stare decisis.
(And we are also undermining the claim that
precedent produces stability.)
The final problem with the Merrill view, and
others like it, is the one common to all
precedent-based theories of constitutional
adjudication. The turtle underneath it is, at
some level, the premise that judges'
interpretations create, fix, or "liquidate"
constitutional meaning, after the fashion of
the common law, at least to some (unclear)
degree. On that premise, however, Paulsen's
Rule still holds: if judges' decisions have the
power to establish constitutional meaning, a
doctrine of stare decisis corrupts that theory
by vesting earlier judges with the power to
usurp, to some degree (usually unspecified),
later judges' power to establish
constitutional meaning.
The correct answer to all of this, of course,
is that stare decisis in constitutional law-
the practice of giving some degree of
decision-altering force to prior judicial
interpretations simply because they are prior
judicial interpretations and in contradiction
of what one otherwise would conclude are
correct principles of constitutional
interpretation and correct interpretive results
produced by such principles-is utterly
unjustifiable. Stare decisis corrupts whatever
interpretive method it touches. It corrupts
fundamentally correct interpretive
principles-original public meaning
textualism. It corrupts fundamentally
incorrect interpretive principles-policy-
driven interpretive theories of every kind.
And it corrupts every interpretive theory that
tries to craft an "in-between" approach,
including, rather ironically, every theory that
accords some measure of interpretive force
to precedents solely by virtue of being
precedents.
In short, whatever theory one concludes is
the correct approach to interpreting and
applying the Constitution, a theory of stare
decisis will inevitably contradict its core
justifying premise(s). A doctrine of stare
decisis always works in opposition to correct
interpretation of the Constitution.
Is there anything at all that can be said in
defense of such a doctrine?
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"Precedents Begin Falling
for Roberts Court"
The New York Times
June 21, 2007
Linda Greenhouse
No Supreme Court nominee could be
confirmed these days without paying homage
to the judicial doctrine of "stare decisis,"
Latin for "to stand by things decided." Yet
experienced listeners have learned to take
these professions of devotion to precedent
"cum grano salis," Latin for "with a grain of
salt."
Both Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr. and
Justice Samuel A. Alito Jr. assured their
Senate questioners at their confirmation
hearings that they, too, respected precedent.
So why were they on the majority side of a
5-to-4 decision last week declaring that a 45-
year-old doctrine excusing people whose
"unique circumstances" prevented them from
meeting court filing deadlines was now
"illegitimate"?
It was the second time the Roberts court had
overturned a precedent, and the first in a
decision with a divided vote. It surely will not
be the last.
The fact is that the court regularly revisits and
reconsiders its precedents, as Chief Justice
William H. Rehnquist, the current chief
justice's former boss and mentor, once
observed succinctly. "Stare decisis is not an
inexorable command." he said in a 1991
opinion that included, in a page and a half of
small type, a list of 33 precedents that the
court had overturned in the previous 20 years.
So the question is not whether the Roberts
court will overturn more precedents, but how
often, by what standard and in what terms. As
to which precedents will fall next, there are
several plausible candidates as the court
enters the final days of its term, including the
2003 decision that upheld advertising
restrictions in the McCain-Feingold campaign
finance law; a 1968 decision that let taxpayers
go to federal court to challenge government
policies as violating the separation of church
and state; and an antitrust price-fixing case
from 1911. (In an 8-to-0 decision last term,
the court overturned a pair of antitrust
precedents from the 1940s that were
noticeably at odds with modem antitrust
analysis.)
Sometimes the court overrules cases without
actually saying so. Some argue that this is
what happened in April, when a 5-to-4
majority upheld the federal Partial-Birth
Abortion Ban Act without making much
effort to reconcile that ruling with a decision
in 2000 that found a nearly identical Nebraska
law unconstitutional.
As a technical matter, the new decision,
Gonzales v. Carhart, left the earlier ruling
still on the books, doing its overruling "by
stealth, without having the grace to admit that
is what they were doing," in the words of
Ronald Dworkin, the legal philosopher, who
wrote a highly critical appraisal of the new
decision in The New York Review of Books
last month. "Justices Roberts and Alito had
both declared their intention to respect
precedent in their confirmation hearings, and
no doubt they were reluctant to admit so soon
how little those declarations were worth,"
Professor Dworkin said from London in an
e-mail message.
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Abortion, of course, is a special case. The
debate over whether the court should or could
overturn Roe v. Wade has been going on so
long and with such intensity that it tends to
pre-empt any discussion of the subtleties of
stare decisis.
Senator Arlen Specter, the Pennsylvania
Republican and abortion-rights supporter who
at the time was chairman of the Senate
Judiciary Committee, pressed Chief Justice
Roberts at his confirmation hearing to agree
with him that Roe v. Wade was not just a
precedent, but a "super-duper precedent." Mr.
Specter's point was that because the court in
1992 had considered whether to overturn Roe
but reaffirmed it instead, the 1973 precedent
had acquired an inviolate status. His
implication was that if Roe was just an
ordinary precedent, it was as vulnerable as
any other with which a new majority became
disenchanted.
The nominee obviously knew exactly what
Mr. Specter was driving at, but he gave away
nothing. He acknowledged the historical
accuracy of the senator's chronology, but
would not follow him to the land of "super-
duper" precedents. When the court explicitly
overturns precedent, it tends to offer a
checklist of justifications: the precedent has
eroded over time through disuse or disregard
(this was the majority's stated reason for
discarding the "unique circumstances"
precedents in last week's decision, Bowles v.
Russell), or it has been a source of confusion
in the law, or experience has proven it
"unworkable."
But the real reason is usually that a changing
court in changing times has come to see the
question in a new light. In Bowers v.
Hardwick in 1986, the Supreme Court
dismissed as "facetious" the notion that the
Constitution offered protection for gay rights.
Overturning that decision 17 years later,
Justice Anthony M. Kennedy declared for the
majority in Lawrence v. Texas: "Bowers was
not correct when it was decided, and it is not
correct today."
Still, the court will strive to provide an
explanation, if only to avoid the kind of
accusation that Justice Thurgood Marshall
leveled at the majority when, taking
advantage of two retirements, the court
reversed course and by a vote of 5 to 4 made
"4victim impact" testimony admissible in death
penalty hearings. "Power, not reason, is the
new currency of this court's decision
making." Justice Marshall declared on the
final day of the court's 1990 term. Two hours
later, he announced his own retirement, his
words still hanging in the air.
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"Process Makes Perfect"
Slate
July 7, 2006
Roger Citron
Every year, immediately after the Supreme
Court term ends, the politics of law briefly
becomes our national obsession. This year,
inevitably, the pundits' focus was on just how
far to the right the court had shifted as a result
of the arrivals of Chief Justice John Roberts
and Justice Samuel Alito. The verdict: Not
that much, according to Linda Greenhouse of
the New York Times. Charles Lane of the
Washington Post concurred in this judgment.
As did Dahlia Lithwick of Slate. According to
this analysis, Roberts' first term can be seen
as a disappointment to conservatives because
the court achieved only a minimal shift to the
political right.
A second disappointment to conservatives
was Roberts' apparent failure to rein in the
"activist" court. That judgment may be short-
sighted. Although Supreme Court justices are
a notoriously independent bunch, Roberts
made substantial progress in bringing about a
more harmonious court. More importantly,
Roberts seemed to deliver on a promise made
at his confirmation hearings: to be a more
minimalist justice and to be guided by legal
principles rather than political preferences.
John Roberts presented himself as a "legal
process" justice at his confirmation hearings.
Legal process was a theory propounded by a
number of elite law professors in the 1950s in
response to the activism of the Supreme Court
under Chief Justice Earl Warren. Adherents
hold that cases should be decided by "neutral
principles" and that the more representative
government actors (Congress, the president,
and his representatives) should decide big
policy questions. They believe in-indeed
they emphasize-the distinction between law
(which they see as an autonomous discipline
governed by reason and principle) and politics
(which they view as merely the expression of
one's political preferences).
Roberts sounded these notes at his hearings,
pledging to be "modest"-no more than "an
umpire calling balls and strikes"-and to
decide cases narrowly so as to promote
consensus on the court. At a speech at
Georgetown this spring he reiterated this
preference for narrow, unanimous decisions.
And the court under Roberts did enjoy an
initial run of unanimity and modesty. As the
term progressed, however, it splintered on a
number of decisions, and on the last day of
the term, refused to defer to the Bush
administration's contention that there should
be no judicial review of the administration's
military commissions. Judicial supremacy, the
commentators maintained, thus remains alive
and well.
And as for Roberts? His earlier talk of
humility and restraint were decried as a
smoke screen for his conservative political
preferences.
But not so fast. Because while the court's
military commissions decision will likely be
the defining case of Roberts' first term-and
it casts a long shadow over the chief justice's
goals of promoting institutional modesty and
unanimity on the court-we should
acknowledge that Roberts still made
substantial progress in bringing about his
goals.
Under Roberts' management, the court was a
more harmonious institution than it has been
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in the past. According to statistics compiled
by the Georgetown University Law Center's
Supreme Court Institute, the court issued
more decisions without dissents than in its
previous two terms. The court also issued
fewer 5-4 decisions, fewer dissenting
opinions, and fewer separate opinions
(concurrences and dissents) than in the
previous term. Complete unanimity on the
court may always be a mirage, but we're
closer to consensus than we were during the
last term of former Chief Justice William
Rehnquist.
A close look at the term also shows the court
rediscovering the "passive virtues"-
professor Alexander Bickel's phrase for
resolution of cases without deciding them (by
returning them to the lower courts or
dismissing them without a decision). The
passive virtues helped the court avoid
political controversy in resolving three cases.
In addition, the court decided two
controversial cases-one involving abortion
rights, the court's perpetual third rail-
"unanimously on narrow grounds," according
to the Supreme Court Institute report. A
modest Supreme Court won't be built in a
day. But the court's use of these techniques
suggests a greater inclination toward restraint
under Roberts than under Rehnquist.
The question for the future: Can Roberts
continue to orient the court toward his goals
of judicial modesty and greater consensus on
the court? If so, he may succeed in his task of
distancing the court from the political fray.
On both the left and the right, skeptics deny
that law can be distinguished from politics.
Critical legal scholars and their disciples on
the left insist that court decisions are no more
than the exercise of political power, and such
cynicism seemed vindicated by, for instance,
the Supreme Court's decision in Bush v.
Gore. On the right, court-bashing continues to
be a popular sport. Although President Bush
has appointed hundreds of sitting federal
judges, some on the far right continue to
attack any federal court that disagrees with
them.
Roberts' ability to deliver a more modest,
"legal process" court depends upon whether
he is deemed sincere in his conviction that
law is separate from politics and can be
consistent in his efforts to reduce the role of
judicial oversight in American political life. A
truly principled Justice follows the law, even
when that route leads to a disappointing
decision. Such sincerity can be measured in
two ways. Do his decisions appear to be
results-oriented? And do his decisions seem
judicial rather than political?
The answer to the first question is possibly,
but not definitely, yes. In his first term,
Roberts voted with the conservative bloc
more frequently than the liberal bloc. (In
particular, he voted more often with Justice
Alito than any other justice and less often
with Justice John Paul Stevens-now
considered the court's most liberal justice-
than any other justice.) Furthermore, Roberts'
votes this term tended toward deference to
other government actors-which in the
current climate tend to support politically
conservative results. Thus, depending upon
your political orientation, his votes were
either cast by a principled jurist or a politician
in a black robe. This is a complicated question
to sort out, and the truth is it's too early to
tell.
But consider two closely decided cases in
which there was no clear majority because the
justices' votes were splintered. In League of
United Latin American Citizens v. Perry, the
voting rights case, Roberts voted consistently
against judicial correction of Texas'
redistricting map. Was Roberts' vote a stand
against judicial oversight of redistricting (a
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political action) taken by the Texas legislature
(a representative body)? Or a vote to preserve
the districts created by the Republican
legislature, presumably for the party's
benefit? You make the call.
Similarly, in Rapanos v. United States, the
court rejected the Army Corps of Engineers'
approach to determining whether wetlands are
"waters" covered by the Clean Water Act.
Roberts joined the other four conservative
justices in ruling against the government. But
before his vote can be dismissed as a political
preference for business and against
regulation, note that his brief concurring
opinion chastised the agency for failing to
properly address the problem itself-thereby
defaulting on the general claim by a
government agency that it is entitled to
deference.
Finally, turn to Roberts' written opinions. His
decisions, so far, have been straightforward
and clear; he tends to eschew footnotes and to
cite only legal authority-prior cases, statutes,
and regulations. After reading Roberts' first
two decisions, David Barron of Harvard Law
School described Roberts' citation practice
earlier this year as "statecraft by hornbook."
Although Barron noted that the opinions have
"a kind of no nonsense quality," he also
expressed concern that they "suggest a vision
of constitutional decision making that is
awfully cramped and technical," in which
"any sense of the broader legal culture that
produces authoritative legal statements" could
be lost.
Roberts would likely be delighted with this
description of his writing. A legal process
justice is the first to acknowledge that neither
he nor the court can do it all. The question for
the next term-with cases involving partial-
birth abortion, the role of race in public high-
school education, and the EPA's authority to
regulate carbon dioxide emissions-is
whether Roberts will continue to move, and to
be seen as moving, the court away from the
political fray.
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"Split Decision"
The New Republic
June 29, 2007
Cass R. Sunstein
Many people feared, or hoped, that President
Bush's appointees to the Supreme Court
would be essentially indistinguishable from
Justices Antonin Scalia and Clarence
Thomas. It turns out that with stunning
regularity, Chief Justice John Roberts and
Justice Samuel Alito are indeed voting the
same way as their conservative colleagues.
Just this week, the four justices, along with
Justice Anthony Kennedy, formed the
majority in decisions involving free speech,
campaign finance, race-conscious pupil
assignments, and taxpayers' standing in
federal court.
Despite this seeming consensus, however,
an intriguing division is emerging among the
Court's conservatives. Roberts and Alito are
conservative minimalists. They prefer to
preserve previous decisions and work within
the law's existing categories. Their opinions
avoid theoretical ambition and tend to be
narrowly focused on the particular problem
at hand. By contrast, Scalia and Thomas are
conservative visionaries, parallel, in many
respects, to such liberal predecessors as
Hugo Black and William 0. Douglas. They
favor fundamental change, immediately. and
their opinions are sweeping and broad, often
calling for overruling longstanding
precedents.
This division was most strikingly apparent
in this week's decision resolving the
important question of whether and when
taxpayers are permitted to challenge federal
expenditures to religious organizations. In
brief, the Court concluded that taxpayers
may not object when the executive branch
uses their money to fund religion. Indeed,
taxpayers may not object if the executive
branch uses public money to make direct
grants to a particular church, or even to
build a church where only Catholics may
worship.
The case revisited the Court's 1968 decision
in Flast v. Cohen, which held that when
Congress has explicitly said that taxpayer
funds will go to religious organizations,
taxpayers are entitled to make constitutional
objections in federal court.
In so ruling, the Court pointed out that a
major purpose of the Constitution's
Establishment Clause, emphasized by James
Madison, is specifically to ensure that
federal funds do not support religion. For
this reason, the ordinary ban on "taxpayer
standing" would be relaxed when taxpayers
objected that their money was going to
support religious institutions.
Conservatives have long despised Flast.
They believe that the Court has been far too
aggressive in insisting on a sharp separation
between church and state. By allowing
taxpayers to challenge federal expenditures,
Flast increased the judicial role in policing
that separation. Moreover, conservatives
object to the idea that taxpayers or citizens
should ever have access to federal court.
They insist that federal judges should get
involved only at the behest of those who
have a personal injury, such as a loss of
liberty or property, that is both "concrete"
and "particularized." They believe that
taxpayers and citizens, as such, lack a
concrete, particularized injury. simply
because any harm to them is speculative,
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remote, or merely psychological.
This week's decision involved a problem
very close to that in Flast. In its faith-based
initiatives, the White House used taxpayer
funds to pay for various conferences, and
these were alleged to promote religion as
such, in violation of the Constitution. Just as
in Flast, taxpayers objected that their money
was being used unlawfully.
The Bush Administration attempted to
distinguish the current case from Flast,
arguing that in that case Congress had
specifically earmarked federal funds for
religious institutions, whereas here the
executive branch was using funds from a
general appropriation. Judge Richard
Posner, writing for the court of appeals,
responded that this was a distinction without
a difference. In the end, all money is
appropriated by Congress, and if taxpayer
funds are going to religious institutions, it
does not matter whether Congress has
specifically ordered the funding. Posner
added that if taxpayers did not have
standing, the executive branch would be
able to use a general appropriation for
whatever religious purpose it chose-for
example, to build a specific church. In his
view, Flast must be read to allow taxpayers
to object to such blatantly unconstitutional
action.
In his opinion, Alito took the minimalist
route. Flast, he explained, was a "narrow"
ruling that depended on a specific fact:
Congress had expressly authorized the use
of federal funds for religious purposes. In
this case, by contrast, there had been no
express authorization. Alito argued that it
made sense to forbid taxpayers to challenge
executive uses of general appropriations,
because otherwise, taxpayers could "enlist
the federal courts to superintend . . . the
speeches, statements, and myriad daily
activities of the President, his staff, and
other Executive Branch officials." And if
taxpayers could so enlist the federal courts,
they would be "virtually continuing
monitors of the wisdom and soundness of
Executive action," which "is not the role of
the judiciary."
Crucially, however, Alito said that the
Court's decision merely would "leave Flast
as we found it," neither extending it nor
overruling it. The Court would "decide only
the case at hand." Taxpayers would continue
to be permitted to challenge any explicit
congressional appropriation of taxpayer
funds for religious purposes. Scalia, joined
by Justice Thomas, refused to join the Alito
opinion, which he described as relying "on
the random and irrational." Scalia argued for
a more ambitious and altogether different
route. In his view, Flast is a "blot on our
jurisprudence" and should be overruled.
Taxpayers could not claim a concrete and
particularized injury; any harm they suffered
was a form of "Psychic Injury," not suited
for adjudication in federal court. Going back
to first principles, Scalia urged that Flast
was evidently wrong, and its errors had to be
"addressed head-on." "Minimalism," Scalia
said, "is an admirable judicial trait," but he
contended that "the soul of the law" is "logic
and reason," which the Court's minimalist
approach failed to offer. Thus he urged that
the Court should insist on "the imposition of
logic and order" on the law, founded on "a
logical theoretical underpinning."
Here, in a nutshell, is the division between
the Court's conservative minimalists and its
visionaries. In the context of a particular
case, which can be resolved without
reference to fundamental principles, Alito
(along with Roberts, and also Kennedy)
does not question past decisions, avoids the
most fundamental disputes, and avoids
theoretical ambition. By contrast, Scalia
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(along with Thomas) is not cautious about
objecting to a "chaotic set of precedents"
and rethinking them from the ground up. We
can see the same disagreements in the many
other areas, including abortion and
campaign finance, in which Alito and
Roberts worked within existing precedent
while Scalia and Thomas urged that Roe v.
Wade and important campaign finance
decisions should be jettisoned immediately.
In the short term, the fissures between the
Court's conservatives do not seem to make
much difference to actual outcomes. While
minimalists tend to be unpredictable, Alito
and Roberts have shown no unpredictability
at all, almost always siding with Scalia and
Thomas in controversial cases.
Notwithstanding their differences, Alito and
Scalia agreed that, so long as there has not
been a specific congressional appropriation,
taxpayers are never permitted to object to
executive branch expenditures of federal
funds for arguably unconstitutional
purposes. To the extent that existing law
allows room to maneuver, it seems there will
apparently be a solid "block" of four
conservatives, usually joined by Justice
Kennedy. In problems ranging from abortion
to employment discrimination to campaign
finance to student speech to affirmative
action to the war on terror, it is entirely
predictable that where current law leaves
gaps or uncertainty, the minimalists and the
visionaries will be able to make common
cause.
It is harder to predict what will happen down
the line. Suppose that the continued vitality
of Flast v. Cohen or Roe v. Wade is raised in
the near future-how will Alito and Roberts
proceed in that event? It is clear that the two
justices do not like to overrule precedents
when it is not necessary to do so in order to
resolve the case at hand. What is less clear is
how the minimalists will proceed when a
case cannot be decided without taking a
stand on a precedent that they reject in
principle. The minimalists and the
visionaries have been able to agree on how
to resolve the key cases this term. It remains
to be seen if their alliance will fracture when
the question of fundamental constitutional
change simply cannot be postponed.
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"So, Do You Believe in 'Superprecedent?"'
The New York Times
October 30, 2005
Jeffrey Rosen
As he prepares for another Supreme Court
confirmation battle, President Bush faces
intense pressure to quell the uproar from
social conservatives who feared that Harriet
Miers was not a true strict constructionist.
Many conservatives say they hope that the
new nominee will follow the lead of Justice
Antonin Scalia and, even more, Justice
Clarence Thomas, who has become a
conservative hero because of his willingness
to overturn many liberal precedents of the
last 70 years, from Roe v. Wade to cases
upholding the New Deal.
But social conservatives face a problem: a
new theory of "superprecedents" that is
gaining currency on the right as well as the
left.
The term superprecedents first surfaced at
the Supreme Court confirmation hearings of
Judge John Roberts, when Senator Arlen
Specter of Pennsylvania, the chairman of the
Judiciary Committee, asked him whether he
agreed that certain cases like Roe had
become superprecedents or "super-duper"
precedents-that is. that they were so deeply
embedded in the fabric of law they should
be especially hard to overturn.
In response, Judge Roberts embraced the
traditional doctrine of "stare decisis"-or,
"let the decision stand"-and seemed to
agree that judges should be reluctant to
overturn cases that had been repeatedly
reaffirmed.
If that is the case, Chief Justice Roberts
would be at odds with the influential part of
the conservative movement that argues that
the Constitution should be strictly construed
in accordance with the intention of the
framers, regardless of the consequences. But
the idea of superprecedents is more powerful
than a simple affirmation of stare decisis.
An origin of the idea was a 2000 opinion
written by J. Michael Luttig, a judge on the
United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit, who regularly appears on
short lists for the Supreme Court. Striking
down a Virginia ban on a procedure that
opponents call partial-birth abortion, Judge
Luttig wrote, "I understand the Supreme
Court to have intended its decision in
Planned Parenthood v. Casey," the case that
reaffirmed Roe in 1992, "to be a decision of
super-stare decisis with respect to a
woman's fundamental right to choose
whether or not to proceed with a
pregnancy.
Before the Roberts confirmation hearings,
Mr. Specter talked informally to several law
professors, including this writer, who
mentioned the theory of super-stare decisis,
noting that Judge Luttig thought it was
important that Roe had been repeatedly
reaffirmed by different Supreme Courts,
composed of justices appointed by
presidents from different parties and
confirmed by Senates controlled at times by
Democrats and Republicans.
And Mr. Specter adopted this theory. At the
hearings, he described their first courtesy
call, in which he asked Judge Roberts about
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the theory of super-stare decisis.
During the hearings, Judge Roberts, who
was serving on the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit,
declined to say whether he agreed that Roe
was a superprecedent or even a "super-
duper" precedent. But, he said, the Casey
decision is itself "a precedent on whether or
not to revisit the Roe v. Wade precedent."
And he also noted that the court over the
past 80 years had reaffirmed the idea that the
Constitution protects a right to privacy.
Later in the Roberts hearings, Charles Fried,
a prominent conservative legal scholar at
Harvard, agreed explicitly that Roe was a
superprecedent. As solicitor general under
President Ronald Reagan, Mr. Fried had
asked the court to overturn Roe. But
testifying on behalf of Judge Roberts, he
said that Roe had become a super-duper
precedent that would not and should not be
overturned, because it was reaffirmed in
1992 and extended in subsequent decisions
protecting gay rights and the right to die.
"It's a big tree, but it has ramified and
exfoliated," said Mr. Fried, and overturning
it "would be an enormous disruption."
The theory of superprecedents is still so new
that it has not been thoroughly debated. But
since the Roberts hearings, prominent liberal
academics have seized on the idea as their
best chance in a generation for countering
the claim of conservative "strict
constructionists" that any precedent should
be overturned if it is inconsistent with the
original understanding of the Constitution.
At a panel discussion at the University of
Minnesota this month, Michael Gerhardt of
the University of North Carolina said that
cases that have been accepted by the Senate,
the White House and different political
leaders over time should be considered
superprecedents. Mr. Gerhardt said it was
hard to be confirmed to the Supreme Court
today unless you accept, as Judge Roberts
did, that the Constitution protects a right to
privacy. "I think the cases upholding the
constitutionality of the New Deal and the
1964 Civil Rights Act are also
superprecedents," he said, along with cases
striking down sex discrimination and
upholding the Miranda warnings. "It's clear
that bedrock precedents are a very powerful
force with lawyers," said Daniel Farber of
the University of California, Berkeley,
another panelist at the Minnesota
conference.
"If somebody had told me in 1968 that
Republicans would make all but two of the
Supreme Court appointments of the next 37
years and at the end of that time, Miranda
would still be on the books, there would be a
constitutional right to abortion, and all the
Warren court's major decisions would still
be there, I never would have believed it."
Still, many conservative scholars say they
remain skeptical. "The fact that something is
a superprecedent doesn't give us a reason to
stick to it if it's wrongly decided," said
Randy Barnett of Boston University Law
School in a response to Mr. Farber and Mr.
Gerhardt at the Minnesota conference.
Other conservatives say they are alarmed by
the embrace of superprecedents by
Republican moderates. "This whole notion
of superprecedent is puzzling, and it's hard
to know what Arlen Specter means by it,"
says Terry Eastland, the legal commentator
of The Weekly Standard. "A case like Roe is
not accepted across the board. It's been quite
a controversial decision from the beginning,
and it really falls into the category of cases
clearly open to discussion."
Indeed, as early as 1992, Earl Maltz, a
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conservative legal scholar at Rutgers,
criticized the Casey decision for endorsing
the idea that "if one side can take control of
the court an issue of major national
importance," it can protect its position from
being reversed "by a kind of super-stare
decisis."
And many liberal scholars also concede that
Roe and Casey may not qualify as a
superprecedent, because the abortion
decisions continue to be hotly contested.
"To me, a bedrock precedent commands a
kind of legal and social consensus that I
don't think is true of Roe," Mr. Farber said.
Mr. Gerhardt agreed. "I think it's hard to
argue that Roe is a superprecedent," he said.
"Roe has been opposed by three presidents
and probably a majority of the Senate right
now." In other words, even if the idea of
superprecedent becomes widely accepted by
senators, judges and legal scholars, there
will be no end to the debate. The question of
what decisions qualify as a superprecedent
would keep the lawyers busy for years to
come.
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"Supreme Confusion"
The New York Times
April 26, 2007
Charles Fried
In supporting John Roberts's nomination to
be chief justice of the United States in 2005,
I spoke to the Senate Judiciary Committee
of his commitment to clarity. consistency
and stability in the law-qualities that
included respect for precedent, essential if
the Supreme Court is to be the guarantor of
legality under the Constitution and not an
unnecessary third political branch of
government. Senator Dianne Feinstein of
California asked whether I thought a Justice
Roberts would vote to overrule Roe v. Wade.
I said I thought he would not, at least not in
its later, less absolute version embodied in
the 1992 Casey decision, which protected
against governments imposing an "undue
burden" on a woman's right to choose
abortion before the fetus's viability. I told
Senator Feinstein that the formulation, and
the principles behind it, had become so
deeply rooted-in the law relied on not only
in abortion cases but by analogy in matters
as widely disparate as the Texas homosexual
sodomy case, compelled visiting rights for
grandparents and the right to die-that its
abandonment would produce the kind of
violent unsettling of the law against which
respect for precedent is meant to protect.
The next year, when I testified in support of
Samuel Alito. Senator Feinstein asked me
the same question. I gave the same answer.
Justice Anthony Kennedy's decision for the
court in the abortion case last week does not
change my mind, because the procedure that
was banned, intact dilation and extraction. is
too rarely used and its importance too
dubious to make much difference. Still, this
most recent decision is disturbing, because
in 2000, in a similar case, the Supreme
Court struck down a Kansas partial birth
abortion ban. The Kansas law was
unacceptably vague, but the principal reason
for the court's earlier decision was that there
was responsible medical opinion that
sometimes the procedure was less risky for
the mother, and therefore in such cases the
ban posed an undue burden. The federal ban
cured the vagueness, but sought to overcome
the medical testimony by a legislative
proclamation of a fact that is not a fact: that
the procedure was never safer for the
mother.
The decision is disturbing because the court
has on numerous occasions refused to allow
Congress to overturn constitutional law by
bogus fact finding, notably in decisions
invalidating the Violence Against Women
Act (which Justice Kennedy joined) and the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act (which
Justice Kennedy wrote). It's disturbing
because Justice Kennedy fails to come to
grips with his own jurisprudence, going so
far as to say that because Congress was
acting under its power to regulate interstate
commerce, it needed only a rational basis to
justify its decision. Where a fundamental
right is involved, such an explanation is
evidently wrong.
It's also disturbing because Justice Kennedy
was not quite willing to embrace his own
conclusion. He suggested that perhaps as
applied in a particular case in which there
was an increased health risk the ban might
be unconstitutional after all. What can that
mean? The very complaint here was that the
ban was unconstitutional because it applies
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in just such situations. Does the court
contemplate a surgeon pausing in the midst
of an operation in which he determines the
banned procedure might be less risky, and
seeking a court order?
Finally, the decision is disturbing for a more
far-reaching reason: there are indeed cases
where the court in the last few years had
become truly incoherent, largely as a result
of Justice O'Connor's pragmatic and
underexplained abandonment of positions
she had earlier agreed to or even proclaimed
on affirmative action and campaign finance.
The first issue has been argued and will be
decided this term of court; campaign finance
is being argued this week. If the justices
eliminate the confusion and restore principle
in those areas, the cry will go up that the
court is simply reflecting its changed
political complexion, not reasoning carefully
and promoting stability and clarity in the
law. And last week's decision will lend
plausibility to that charge.
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"Supreme Humility"
The Wall Street Journal
July 2, 1997
Michael W. McConnell
Last week's assisted suicide decision
reflects the U.S. Supreme Court's restored
commitment to decentralized democracy.
Rather than attempting to impose its own
nationwide solution to difficult and
contentious questions of moral and social
policy (as it did in the abortion cases), the
court seems to have realized that in the
absence of clear direction in our
constitutional text or history, it is better to
allow the people and their elected
representatives to wrestle with these
problems.
This reflects a return to humility, after
several decades in which the court seemed
to view its job as second-guessing the
wisdom of democratic judgments. Last week
the justices expressly recognized that other
institutions in our society often are better
positioned to resolve important issues of
principle. The justices took off the robes of
the philosopher king and donned the more
humble garments of judges in a democratic
society-deciding cases according to
constitutional norms established by the
people over time, rather than according to
what they candidly called "the policy
preferences of the members of this Court."
Writing for a five-justice majority, Chief
Justice William Rehnquist explained that
when the court declares a new constitutional
"right," it places the matter "outside the
arena of public debate and legislative
action." This is legitimate only when the
asserted right is based either on explicit
constitutional text or on the "history and
tradition" of the nation. This cautious
approach ensures that constitutional law is
rooted in the will of the people and in
principles that have stood the test of time.
By declining to find a right to assisted
suicide, the court does not purport to resolve
the question. but simply "permits this debate
to continue, as it should in a democratic
society."
Although the court was unanimous in
declining to find a right to assisted suicide,
four of the justices wrote concurring
opinions in which they said they would
reserve a larger role for judicial discretion.
But with the sole exception of Justice John
Paul Stevens, all expressed healthy
skepticism about the competence and
legitimacy of the judiciary in making social
policy. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor (who
joined the majority opinion) made the telling
observation that "every one of us at some
point may be affected by our own or a
family member's terminal illness," and
legitimate when the rights of a discrete
minority (like blacks in the Jim Crow South)
are at stake. But when the people of the
states decided to restrict assisted suicide,
they were not imposing their will on a
minority. They were legislating for
themselves and their loved ones.
Justice David Souter emphasized that the
case turned on the relative "institutional
competence" of legislatures and courts.
When the consequences of recognizing a
new right are unknown, legislatures have the
advantage both of superior fact finding and
of the ability to experiment. It seems the
justices have learned something from their
experience with the abortion cases.
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The great institutional strength of courts is
their ability to enforce legal principles with
consistency. treating like cases alike
regardless of the temper of the times. But
that virtue becomes a vice when principles
are in flux and the consequences of new
approaches are unpredictable. Constitutional
judicial review is too inflexible a process to
deal with an issue like assisted suicide.
There are four characteristics of the federal
judiciary that make it a poor-and
dangerous-social-policy maker. First, any
answer imposed by the courts in the name of
the Constitution will apply across the nation.
Perhaps that makes sense when our national
experience points to a single answer. But on
a novel and complicated social question like
the treatment of the terminally ill, it would
be foolhardy indeed for nine people sitting
in a courtroom in Washington, D.C.., to write
the rules for everyone. There is no reason to
think that every state must have the same
laws pertaining to end-of-life decisions; and
we can all learn from the experience of
states with different policies.
Second, constitutional decisions are difficult
to change, even when mistaken. The
legitimacy of the constitutional system
depends on its stability: It strains public
credulity that the meaning of the
Constitution would change rapidly and
often. By contrast, legislatures can try new
approaches, and then modify or abandon
them in light of experience and criticism.
The state of Oregon has undertaken an
experiment in physician-assisted suicide
that-however misguided it may appear to
many of us-will cast light on the practical
consequences. Other states may try other
approaches. To treat this social-policy
question as one of federal constitutional law
would cut short this process.
Third. because any lines drawn by courts
must be based on constitutional principle
and not on prudential compromise, it is
difficult to limit a new right once it has been
recognized. The plaintiffs challenging the
New York assisted suicide law maintained
that there is no real difference between
allowing patients to forgo lifesaving medical
treatment (which is allowed) and allowing
their doctors to prescribe affirmative
measures to bring about death (which is
forbidden). The court correctly held that the
distinction between killing and letting die is
reasonable and legitimate. But if it had gone
the other way, where could it stop? On what
principled basis could the "right" be denied
to competent patients who face the prospect
of extreme pain not just for a few months
but for many years? How could assistance
be limited to those physically capable of
administering the lethal poison to
themselves? Why limit the right to people in
physical pain? Why not those distressed at
the prospect of the loss of memory or
mobility, or of a loved one? And don't
patients out of their minds with pain, or in a
coma, need this help more than anyone? (So
much for the requirement of voluntariness.)
Once assisted suicide is recognized as a
constitutional right, it is difficult to see how
the right could be confined to a narrow class
of patients-just as, once the right to
abortion was recognized, it proved difficult
to limit it in any serious way.
Fourth, the Supreme Court is the most
unrepresentative body in our governing
structure. All its members are from a single
profession; they are deliberately insulated
from ordinary people. They rarely have
experience in the matters about which they
adjudicate. They are very busy (deciding
around 100 cases every year), and have
relatively little time for study and reflection.
They rely on arrogant kids just out of law
school for information, counsel and
assistance. By contrast, now that the
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question of assisted suicide has been left to
the states, a much wider range of voices will
be heard-in churches and synagogues,
legislative halls, radio talk shows, hospital
ethics committees, jury rooms, learned
journals and less-learned ones, within
healthy families and families in pain.
Sometimes, the best and most peaceful
solution to a contentious moral conflict is
not to adopt a sweeping principle and reject
the other position, but to construct a
compromise that allows each side to believe
that society is responsive to its deeply held
convictions. Legislatures are good at that.
It takes a special kind of hubris for judges to
think they have the best answers to social
problems about which knowledgeable
people of good will do not agree and we
have no national experience to guide us.
Judge Stephen Reinhardt of the Ninth
Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals, who
announced the right to assisted suicide last
year and was reversed last week, described
the arguments of those who favor legal
restrictions on assisted suicide as "cruel,"
"untenable," "disingenuous and fallacious,"
"meretricious," "ludicrous" and "nihilist."
He praised his court's own opinion as "more
enlightened." The Second Circuit declared
there was no "rational basis" for allowing
refusal of life-sustaining care but prohibiting
assisted suicide-never mind that this is the
position of almost every U.S. state and
almost every nation in the world, as well as
professional associations of doctors,
psychologists and experts in the care of the
elderly.
It is far from clear that federal judges are
more "enlightened" and "rational" than the
rest of us. And it is refreshing to see the
Supreme Court exhibit the humility that the
lower courts so conspicuously lacked. The
court's majority says that "in every due
process case" where our constitutional text
and history are silent and our national
experience provides no clear answer, it
intends to allow the democratic processes of
the 50 states to prevail. That will be a very
great improvement over the preceding
decades of judicial overreach.
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"The Assault on Faux Judicial Restraint"
SCOTUS Blog
June 25. 2007
Lyle Denniston
Now and then, a foctnote in a Supreme
Court opinion is so provocative, so
perceptive, or both, that it speaks almost as
loudly as the body of the opinions
themselves. In the election campaign ads
ruling on Monday, Justice Antonin Scalia
unleashes this broadside at the main opinion,
written by Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr.:
[T]he principal opinion's attempt
at distinguishing McConnell [v.
FEC] is unpersuasive enough, and
the change in the law it works is
substantial enough, that seven
Justices of the Court, having
widely divergent views concerning
the constitutionality of the
restrictions at issue, agree that the
opinion effectively overrules
McConnell without saying so. This
faux judicial restraint is judicial
obfuscation.
Aside from the substance of the remark, it is
especially noteworthy because it is a direct
assault on the version of judicial modesty
that seems to be-at least at this early stage
of the "Roberts Court"-the decision-
making style that the new Chief Justice has
so often advocated publicly. (Perhaps also to
be left aside is that Justice Scalia himself
joined earlier in the Term in a ruling by the
Court, in the partial-birth abortion
decision-Gonzales v. Carhart-that can be
read as having overruled precedent without
sayimg so.)
The Chief Justice's opinion in the combined
cases of FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life (06-
969) and McCain v. Wisconsin Right to Life
(06-970) is the latest example of the Court's
moving away from major precedent without
actually saying explicitly that the prior
ruling was being set aside. The Chief Justice
has talked with some fervor about the value
of respecting precedent, and the need to
keep overrulings to a minimum, if not truly
rare. But the new conservative majority on
the Court is plainly uncomfortable with
some of the precedents it confronts-and the
McConnell decision was a prime candidate
for overruling. In fact, both sides in the case
had been granted additional space in briefing
to argue whether it should be cast aside.
In the end, all that the Chief Justice's
opinion would say on the point was that "we
have no occasion to revisit" the McConnell
decision as it applied to federal regulation of
broadcast ads aired by corporations and
labor unions in election season. But what
remains of that aspect of the 2003 decision
divided the Court deeply in the various
writings on Monday. And the end result is
that, if it is hanging on, it is just by a thread.
In fact, the numbers show how vulnerable it
is: three Justices wanted to overrule it
outright, Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr.. is
revealed to be strongly tempted to do that
when and if the issue comes back again, and
the Chief Justice's tolerance of it as a
precedent is fleeting at most. The only thing
that might keep that part of McConnell on
the books, technically not overruled, is that
the Chief Justice's new opinion could make
it entirely unnecessary to do so-the
campaign ads will flow freely in the weeks
closest to elections, with full First
Amendment protection, unless they leave no
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doubt that what they really say is "vote for
Jones" or "vote against Smith." Those who
draft campaign ads' content will have no
trouble avoiding such blatant advocacy and
yet leaving no one in doubt which outcome
is preferred by the ads' sponsors.
The Chief Justice's opinion has these central
parts:
A. The First Amendment protects a
campaign ad on radio, TV, cable or satellite
outlets by a corporation and labor union
using its own treasury funds, unless no
reasonable person, seeing or hearing that ad,
would interpret it "as an appeal to vote for
or against a specific candidate."
B. The intent of the ad's sponsor is not to be
considered, no matter what other activities
the sponsor may have carried out that
revealed its true preferences. The focus of
any inquiry into an ad's legality under the
new standard is just what the ad says-its
actual words and pictures-without regard
to any outside indications of what was
intended.
C. The ad can be run as close to election
time-primary or general election-as the
sponsor wishes.
D. Any public policy issue it discusses,
while naming a person who happens to be a
candidate that season, need not be a live
issue in public debate at the moment.
E. If a given ad is challenged in court as
being over the specified line, a court may
allow only minimal inquiry-if any at all-
into the nature of the ad and whether it does
cross the line. If there is any dispute about
that, the ad and its sponsor "must be given
the benefit of the doubt."
However permissive that formulation may
be in actual practice, it is clear that it is
considerably more tolerant than almost
anyone contemplated at the time the
McConnell decision came down. In fact, a
respected U.S. District Court, after
McConnell, had interpreted that decision to
mean that election season ads had simply
been banned, if paid for by corporations and
labor unions out of their own treasuries, and
there was no way they could be challenged a
case at a time.
Last Term, the "Roberts Court" said that
was a misreading of McConnell, and set the
stage for the as-applied challenge that
resulted, on Monday, is what appears to be
more in reality than an as-applied ruling.
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"The Roberts Court and
the Role of Precedent"
NPR Morning Edition
July 12, 2007
Nina Totenberg
For decades conservatives have yearned for
control of the U.S. Supreme Court. For
decades, they have been frustrated in
achieving that goal, despite having as many as
seven Republican appointees on the court.
This term, though, conservatives seem to have
reached the promised land. With new Chief
Justice John Roberts at the helm and Justice
Samuel Alito replacing justice Sandra Day
O'Connor, the direction of the court for this
term, at least, has been transformed.
For conservatives, this term was pretty close
to the best of times, and for liberals, it was
pretty close to the worst of times. Although
Roberts and Alito both promised at their
confirmation hearings to honor precedent
whenever possible, in their first full term
together, they effectively reversed a number
of key precedents. In each case, it was by a 5-
to-4 vote.
The court upheld a federal law banning so
called partial-birth abortions, though it had
struck down a nearly identical law just seven
years ago. The court effectively eviscerated a
key provision of the McCain-Feingold
campaign finance law, even though the court
had upheld that provision just three years ago.
In employment discrimination, the court
dramatically limited the ability of workers to
file employment discrimination claims.
On school desegregation, the court limited the
ability of school boards to adopt voluntary
desegregation plans that use race as a factor in
assigning some students to schools.
In each of these decisions, the key votes in the
majority claimed to be adopting a modest and
limited approach. "What we actually have is a
pretty bold conservative agenda but it's
clothed in the gentle language of traditional
modesty and restraint," says Kathleen
Sullivan, director of the Stanford Law
Constitutional Law Center.
Or, as Stanford Professor Pam Karlan puts it,
"I think, practically, the court has overruled a
number of cases. But the chief can say with a
straight face, 'I didn't vote to overrule it. I
simply limited the earlier decisions to its
facts, or I refused to extend the earlier
decision."'
The court was more polarized than at any
time in recent memory, with fully one-third of
the court's decisions reached by a 5-to-4 vote,
and the liberals spoke with an unusually
unified voice in dissent. As Justice Stephen
Breyer put it in the school desegregation case:
"It is not often in the law that so few have so
quickly changed so much."
The court's new swing justice, Anthony
Kennedy, was in the majority in each of the
24 5-to-4 rulings. And Supreme Court scholar
Tom Goldstein says Kennedy's influence has
been significant. "No justice has had so strong
an influence on a Supreme Court term in at
least 40 years," says Goldstein. "When you
talk about the raw number of decisions where
he dissented, only twice, or the 5-4 decisions
where he was never in dissent, it was
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unquestionably Justice Kennedy's term and it
looks like it's Justice Kennedy's court."
Yale Law School Professor Akhil Amar says
Kennedy is the linchpin.
"John Roberts presides but Kennedy pivots,"
says Amar. Notre Dame Law School
Professor Rick Garnett says Kennedy's role is
clear. "Justice Kennedy sees himself as the
justice who is mediating between these two
increasingly polarized ways of understanding
the constitution and seems to me that he is
likely to be relishing it," says Garnett.
But all is not peace and love on the
conservative side of the court. Justices
Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas, in a
number of cases, wanted to go farther than
Roberts and Alito. In the campaign finance
case, Scalia accused Roberts of effectively
overruling the court's past decision without
saying so. This faux judicial restraint, said
Scalia, is judicial obfuscation.
"Justice Scalia is saying in his opinion that
the chief justice's modesty, his unwillingness
to overturn these longstanding precedents is
actually phony. That he's not being honest
about how conservative he is," says
Goldstein.
Sullivan says Scalia and Thomas have a very
different approach from Roberts and Alito.
"It's as if Justices Scalia and Thomas would
like to come in and blow things up. And Chief
Justice Roberts and Justice Alito take some of
these old precedents, and, instead, they chip
away at the foundations. so that they'll blow
over in a strong wind, but it's a very different
approach."
George Mason University Professor Neomi
Rao is a former law clerk for Justice Thomas.
"There's an agreement perhaps amongst some
of the conservatives and some of the liberals
that the minimalists as it were are being less
than forthright in what they're doing," she
says.
Ted Olson, who served as solicitor general in
the first Bush administration, says Scalia is
worried about not solidifying the new
conservative approach while he can. "I think
he's looking into the future, who's going to be
the next justice on the court and how will that
change the balance and if the court doesn't do
away with precedents that he thinks are
unacceptable and wrongly decided they're
going to be around to bite him later on,"
Olson says.
But Columbia Law School Professor Michael
Dorf, a former Kennedy clerk, says that
Justice Kennedy, who so often cast the
pivotal, fifth vote, is more temperamentally in
tune with the more modest approach.
"Part of what you're seeing may be that he
finds Roberts and Alito less scary than
Justices Scalia and Thomas because they
aren't bomb throwers, and it's possible that
the Roberts strategy of incremental moves
and not acknowledging when he's overturning
precedents is appealing to Justice Kennedy,"
says Dorf.
What's more, says Goldstein, conservatives
still win in the end. "The differences between
the conservatives don't amount to a hill of
beans. It's all about theory, in practice five
justices on the right agreed on the result and
were willing to change the law in the
direction the thought it had to go," says
Goldstein.
No case better illustrates that than the
abortion case. Not only are states now fieer
than before to regulate abortion, many
observers note how the court's emphasis has
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changed dramatically, from the doctor and the
patient, to the unborn child.
George Annas, chairman of the Department of
Health Law, Bioethics and Human Rights at
Boston University, contends that, until this
term's abortion decision, most scholars
considered the doctor-patient relationship to
be protected in some fundamental constitution
sense. "That as long as physicians were
practicing for the best interests and health of
their patients, with their patients' informed
consent, and consistent with good medical
practice, the government could not interfere
with that relationship. That no longer is the
law," says Annas.
In many cases this term, the court's majority
did not rule on the merits of a case, but ruled
that individuals had no right to be in court.
For example, the court, by a 5-to-4 vote, ruled
that taxpayers could not challenge the
president's faith-based initiative in court.
One small case that many scholars consider
emblematic of the court's new formalism was
a ruling that a convicted defendant had lost
his right to appeal because his lawyer relied
on a judge's order to file the appeal within 17
days, instead of the 14 days in the statute. The
judge had erroneously factored in the
weekend in setting the deadline.
The court's five-justice majority overruled a
line of previous decisions, to say there should
be no flexibility when such errors
inadvertently occur. "These results strike me
as simply mean, in that they enforce a kind of
strict letter of the law approach, with out any
obvious benefit. This struck me at least as
something out of a Dickens novel, or perhaps
even Kafka," says Dorf. That echoes what the
four, liberal dissenters said in many cases, but
they did not prevail.
At his confirmation hearing, Roberts said he
viewed the role of a judge as that of an
umpire, to call balls and strikes. "One of the
most famous umpires in major ball history,
Bill Klem, was once asked, 'Was that a ball or
a strike,' and he said, 'You know, it's not a
ball or a strike until I say it is.' So this idea of
the umpire as someone who just follows a
rule book, has been kind of exploded this
term," says Karlan.
499
Excerpt from "The Power of Precedent"
The following is an excerpt from Chapter 4 in Professor Michael Gerhardt's book, "The Power
of Precedent," Oxford University Press, forthcoming 2007.
The meaning and value of precedent
depends on how subsequent justices
construe it. For instance, the justices who
decided Korematsu v. United States and
Brown did not frame either decision with
affirmative action in mind. Yet, in Adarand
and Croson, a majority of justices relied on
Brown and Korematsu for the proposition
that all race-based classifications must be
subjected to strict scrutiny.
Similarly, in striking down voluntary
desegregation plans in Seattle and
Louisville, the Roberts' Court's majority
relied on Brown for the principle that nearly
all race-based classifications, no matter how
benign they purport to be. are illegitimate
because they are motivated by, or reflect, the
same racial attitudes which the Fourteenth
Amendment purportedly was designed to
eliminate from public decision-making. It
did not matter that Brown had not clarified
the level of scrutiny it had employed or that
Korenatsu plainly had involved a race-
based classification directed against a
relatively powerless minority. Nor did it
matter that a minority of the Roberts Court
claimed that a more coherent, honest reading
of Brown supported, rather than
undermined, the voluntary desegregation
plans in Seattle and Louisville. What
mattered was how subsequent justices
construed either Brown or Korematsu. The
ultimate meaning of a precedent, what it
ultimately comes to signify, depends in part
on how justices construe what their
predecessors did.
Social scientists and legal scholars study the
implications of subsequent uses of
precedents by analyzing their network
effects. When we study network effects, we
find that the values of precedents-their
significance in constitutional law-increase
the more often they are cited. Conversely,
the values of precedents decrease the less
often they are cited-or the more often they
are criticized. So, for example, Brown's
value as a precedent has increased with the
frequency with which it has been approving
cited by not only the Court but also other
constitutional authorities. Moreover, we can
expect the value of Korematsu to drop
dramatically based on how rarely it is cited
and even then without approval.
In their recent network analysis of
precedent, social scientists James Fowler
and Sangick Jeon reached several
conclusions with implications for both the
attitudinal model and the golden rule of
precedent. They found by the early 20t
century "the norm [of stare decisis] had
taken hold, even though there is strong
evidence that the activist Warren Court later
deviated from it. Later Courts also tended to
skip over the decisions of the Warren Court,
reaching back in time to rulings that were
more firmly rooted in precedent."
Of even greater significance is their finding
"that reversed cases tended to be much more
important [or salient] than other decisions,
and the cases overrul[ing] them quickly
become and remain . more important as
the reversed decisions decline. We also
show the Court is careful to ground
overruling decisions in past precedent, and
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the care it exercises is increasing in the
importance of the decision that is
overruled." These findings are more
significant because they indicate the Court
avoids repetitive overrulings or tends to
limit the numbers of times it revisits
previously litigated questions of
constitutional law. The Court tends not to
repeatedly re-open issues, regardless of
justices' ideological preferences or the
salience of issues.
There are, however, phenomena which the
study of network effects neglects. First, the
network effects of precedent extend beyond
courts. If the meanings or values of
precedents depend on their frequency of
their citation, we should measure how-and
how often-it is cited by non-judicial
authorities. Presumably, a precedent's
values increase the more often it is
approvingly cited by judicial and/or non-
judicial authorities. Moreover, non-judicial
authorities produce precedents, whose
meanings or values depend, in turn, on the
frequency with they are approvingly cited by
courts or other institutions. Second,
citations are not fungible. Contrary to what
some lay people and even some social
scientists believe, not all precedents are
created equal. Some end up mattering more
than others, and there are practical limits to
the purposes for which public authorities
cite either their own or judicial precedents.
As the next two chapters demonstrate, non-
judicial authorities are instrumental in
shaping the values, meanings, and
endurance of precedents.
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